نسخهٔ وب مستقل — پلتفرم نیروی کار هوش مصنوعی

مخزن اختصاصی برنامهٔ وب؛ محتوای پوشهٔ web در ریشهٔ مخزن قرار گرفت.
تاریخچهٔ پروژهٔ ربات (agy-bot) در این مخزن وجود ندارد و هیچ وابستگی runtime به آن نیست.

apps/api/tests/test_redact.py

@@ -0,0 +1,221 @@
+"""The redactor is the only thing standing between an exception payload and a
+password in the database. These tests try to defeat it the way real code does:
+secrets nested in dicts, buried in DSNs, wearing an unexpected key name.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import pytest
+
+from app.core.redact import (
+    REDACTED,
+    is_sensitive_key,
+    redact,
+    redact_headers,
+    redact_mapping,
+    redact_text,
+)
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Structural layer — sensitive keys
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    "key",
+    [
+        "password",
+        "PASSWORD",
+        "Passwd",
+        "api_key",
+        "apiKey",
+        "X-API-Key",
+        "authorization",
+        "Authorization",
+        "access_token",
+        "refreshToken",
+        "client_secret",
+        "private_key",
+        "gitea_admin_token",
+        "stripe_secret_key",
+        "db_password",
+        "encryption_key",
+    ],
+)
+def test_sensitive_keys_are_recognised(key: str) -> None:
+    assert is_sensitive_key(key) is True
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    "key",
+    [
+        "token_count",
+        "input_tokens",
+        "output_tokens",
+        "max_tokens",
+        "total_tokens",
+        "name",
+        "email",
+        "organization_id",
+        "command",
+        "status_code",
+    ],
+)
+def test_usage_counters_and_ordinary_keys_are_not_sensitive(key: str) -> None:
+    """``input_tokens`` is billing data, not a credential.
+
+    Over-eager matching here would quietly destroy the usage numbers the error
+    log exists to help debug.
+    """
+    assert is_sensitive_key(key) is False
+
+
+def test_sensitive_key_value_is_replaced_whatever_it_looks_like() -> None:
+    # The value has no recognisable shape at all — only the key gives it away.
+    payload = {"password": "correct horse battery staple", "username": "demo"}
+    result = redact_mapping(payload)
+    assert result["password"] == REDACTED
+    assert result["username"] == "demo"
+
+
+def test_redaction_reaches_into_nested_structures() -> None:
+    payload = {
+        "request": {
+            "headers": {"Authorization": "Bearer abcdefghijklmnop"},
+            "body": {"user": {"password": "hunter2", "email": "demo@example.com"}},
+        },
+        "providers": [{"api_key": "sk-abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz"}, {"name": "openai"}],
+    }
+    result = redact(payload)
+    assert result["request"]["headers"]["Authorization"] == REDACTED
+    assert result["request"]["body"]["user"]["password"] == REDACTED
+    assert result["request"]["body"]["user"]["email"] == "demo@example.com"
+    assert result["providers"][0]["api_key"] == REDACTED
+    assert result["providers"][1]["name"] == "openai"
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Lexical layer — recognisable values under harmless keys
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def test_bearer_token_in_a_free_text_message_is_scrubbed() -> None:
+    text = "upstream rejected the credential Bearer eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9.abcdefgh.ijklmnop"
+    scrubbed = redact_text(text)
+    assert "eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9" not in scrubbed
+    assert "Bearer" in scrubbed  # the scheme stays, it is not the secret
+
+
+def test_authorization_header_form_is_scrubbed_once_not_twice() -> None:
+    """``Authorization: Bearer <jwt>`` is a *sensitive key*, so the whole value
+    goes — and it must not leave a doubled ``[REDACTED] [REDACTED]`` behind."""
+    text = "request failed: Authorization: Bearer eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9.abcdefgh.ijklmnop"
+    scrubbed = redact_text(text)
+    assert "eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9" not in scrubbed
+    assert scrubbed.count(REDACTED) == 1
+
+
+def test_jwt_anywhere_in_a_message_is_scrubbed() -> None:
+    token = (
+        "eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9"
+        ".eyJzdWIiOiIxMjM0NTY3ODkwIn0"
+        ".dBjftJeZ4CVPmB92K27uhbUJU1p1r_wW1gFWFOEjXk"
+    )
+    scrubbed = redact_text(f"token decode failed for {token} at step 3")
+    assert token not in scrubbed
+    assert "at step 3" in scrubbed
+
+
+def test_url_credentials_are_stripped_but_host_is_kept() -> None:
+    scrubbed = redact_text("could not connect to postgresql://agy:s3cr3t@db.internal:5432/agy")
+    assert "s3cr3t" not in scrubbed
+    assert "db.internal" in scrubbed  # the useful part survives
+
+
+def test_provider_key_shapes_are_scrubbed() -> None:
+    for secret in (
+        "sk-abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz012345",
+        "ghp_abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789",
+        "AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE",
+        "xoxb-1234567890-abcdefghijkl",
+    ):
+        assert secret not in redact_text(f"provider call failed: {secret}")
+
+
+def test_pem_private_key_block_is_scrubbed() -> None:
+    pem = (
+        "-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----\n"
+        "MIIEowIBAAKCAQEA1234567890abcdefghijklmnop\n"
+        "-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----"
+    )
+    scrubbed = redact_text(f"failed to load key:\n{pem}")
+    assert "MIIEowIBAAKCAQEA" not in scrubbed
+    assert "REDACTED_PRIVATE_KEY" in scrubbed
+
+
+def test_inline_key_value_pair_in_a_larger_string() -> None:
+    scrubbed = redact_text("webhook rejected: password=hunter2&retries=3")
+    assert "hunter2" not in scrubbed
+    assert "retries=3" in scrubbed
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Third net — configured secrets matched by value
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def test_the_configured_jwt_secret_is_scrubbed_by_value() -> None:
+    """The strongest guarantee: a real configured secret never reaches storage.
+
+    The test suite sets a 32+ byte ``JWT_SECRET``; whatever it is, it must not
+    survive redaction even when it appears with no key and no recognisable shape.
+    """
+    from app.core.config import settings
+
+    secret = settings.jwt_secret
+    scrubbed = redact_text(f"signature check failed comparing against {secret} directly")
+    assert secret not in scrubbed
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Robustness — the redactor must never break a handler
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def test_headers_are_scrubbed_and_lowercased() -> None:
+    result = redact_headers(
+        {"Authorization": "Bearer abcdefghijkl", "User-Agent": "curl/8.0", "Cookie": "sid=xyz"}
+    )
+    assert result["authorization"] == REDACTED
+    assert result["cookie"] == REDACTED
+    assert result["user-agent"] == "curl/8.0"
+
+
+def test_bytes_become_a_length_not_a_body() -> None:
+    assert redact(b"\x00\x01\x02\x03") == "<4 bytes>"
+
+
+def test_scalars_pass_through_untouched() -> None:
+    assert redact(42) == 42
+    assert redact(1.5) == 1.5
+    assert redact(True) is True
+    assert redact(None) is None
+
+
+def test_empty_inputs_are_handled() -> None:
+    assert redact_mapping(None) == {}
+    assert redact_headers(None) == {}
+    assert redact_text("") == ""
+
+
+def test_very_long_input_is_bounded() -> None:
+    """A 5 MB blob must not be handed to the regex engine whole."""
+    scrubbed = redact_text("x" * 5_000_000)
+    assert len(scrubbed) < 100_000
+    assert "truncated" in scrubbed
+
+
+def test_non_string_keys_do_not_raise() -> None:
+    result = redact_mapping({1: "a", (2, 3): "b", None: "c"})
+    assert result["1"] == "a"
+    assert result["None"] == "c"