feat(delivery): docker sandbox adapter + owner-only infrastructure (v2 phase A3-1)
The execution boundary for v2. Adds the local docker/podman sandbox adapter and the hardened host subprocess runner every other delivery adapter will use. - adapters/process.py: the one place the platform shells out. argv-only (no shell), start_new_session + killpg on timeout, concurrent stdout/stderr drains with a byte cap, explicit minimal env (never os.environ), and a missing binary reported as spawn_failed rather than an exception. - adapters/docker_sandbox.py: DockerSandboxAdapter over SandboxProviderPort. --user 1000:1000, --cap-drop ALL, no-new-privileges, pids/cpu/memory limits, --read-only with tmpfs scratch, one bind mount (the work tree, never the git dir), labels, no published ports. Path-safe file access; secrets refused in `docker exec -e`. Extras for later phases: start_demo_container (loopback publish only), list_managed_containers, remove_container. - registry: SANDBOX_PROVIDER=docker, cached singleton so the workspace registry survives create_workspace -> start_session. - sandbox_gateway worker: reap_orphans() removes labelled containers no live session points at, audited as sandbox.reap; run_pass() does both passes. - sandbox router: every mutating route now requires the platform owner (PLAN-v2 §7.7); read-only status routes stay open to org members. - sandbox-panel: canManageInfra prop (fails closed) hides the create form, the session panel and the action buttons from non-owners. Tests: 346 API (+37), 67 web (+3); ruff, mypy, tsc and lint clean. Three existing tests now drive the sandbox as the platform owner, since that is who may touch it. Report: docs/plan/reports/agent-3-phase-1.md
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mjalmoudy94
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# Agent 3 — Phase 1 report: Docker sandbox adapter
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Date: 2026-10-13 · Branch: `dev` (work done directly on `dev`; see "Deviations")
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## What was done
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### 1.1 `DockerSandboxAdapter` (`app/infrastructure/adapters/docker_sandbox.py`)
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Implements `SandboxProviderPort` over the docker/podman CLI, with the binary taken from
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`SANDBOX_DOCKER_BIN` so podman is a drop-in (the flags used are the common subset).
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- `create_workspace` — creates `SANDBOX_WORKSPACES_ROOT/<org>/<project>/work` at `0700`, and
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encodes the workspace identity in the external id (`ws-<org>-<project>`) so a restarted
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process can rebuild the host paths without a database round-trip. One workspace per
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application, per D5.
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- `start_session` — `docker run -d` with the full hardening set:
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`--user 1000:1000`, `--cap-drop ALL`, `--security-opt no-new-privileges`, `--pids-limit 512`,
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`--cpus`, `--memory`, `--read-only` + `--tmpfs /tmp` + `--tmpfs /home/app`,
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a single bind mount of the work dir at `/workspace`, labels
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`smart-org.org` / `smart-org.project` / `smart-org.role`, default bridge network and **no
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published ports**. It reuses an existing container of the same name rather than stacking
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duplicates after a restart.
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- `run_command` — `docker exec -w <cwd> <ctr> sh -lc <cmd>`. `cwd` and `on_output` are
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adapter-level extras for the engine; the port signature is unchanged. Environment variables
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are passed with `-e`, and any key that looks like a secret is **refused** — argv is visible
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in `ps`, so credentials must never travel that way.
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- `read_file` / `write_file` — through the host bind mount, with `safe_join` path safety
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(rejects `..`, absolute escapes and symlinks that resolve outside the work dir).
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- `pause` / `resume` / `destroy` — stop / start / `rm -f -v`.
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- `snapshot` — `docker commit`, documented as capturing the root filesystem only (the work
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tree is a bind mount and is *not* included).
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- `get_preview_url` — `http://127.0.0.1:<port>`, and it refuses a platform-protected port.
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- Extras used by later phases: `start_demo_container` (loopback-only publish, same hardening,
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`role=demo`), `list_managed_containers`, `remove_container`, `host_dir_for`,
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`binary_available`, plus the module-level `image_for_language` map
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(node:20-bookworm, python:3.13-bookworm, php:8.3-cli, golang:1.23, debian:bookworm fallback).
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### 1.1a `app/infrastructure/adapters/process.py` (new, shared)
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The one place the platform shells out. `run_process` exists to make four failure modes
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impossible:
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- **shell injection** — `create_subprocess_exec` with an argv list, never `shell=True`;
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- **orphaned children** — `start_new_session=True` and `killpg` on timeout (SIGTERM then
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SIGKILL), so a `docker build`'s helpers die with it;
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- **pipe deadlock** — stdout and stderr drained concurrently by two tasks, with a byte cap
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applied while streaming (the callback still sees every chunk, so live logs stay complete);
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- **secret inheritance** — an explicit minimal `env` (a handful of safe keys), never
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`os.environ` wholesale.
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A missing binary returns `spawn_failed=True` rather than raising; a non-zero exit or a
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timeout is an ordinary result the caller inspects.
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### 1.2 Registry
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`get_sandbox_provider()` now maps `SANDBOX_PROVIDER=docker` to the adapter (cached as a
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singleton so the workspace registry stays consistent between `create_workspace` and the
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`start_session` that follows). `mock` remains the default; `daytona`/`e2b` are unchanged.
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### 1.3 Orphan reaping
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`SandboxGatewayWorker.reap_orphans()` lists every container carrying our labels and removes
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any whose id is not in `SandboxSessionRepository.list_active_external_ids()` (new method).
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Each removal is audited as `sandbox.reap` with `reason=orphan_container`. A provider without
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`list_managed_containers` is skipped silently.
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`SandboxGatewayWorker.run_pass()` runs idle-session reaping and orphan reaping in one pass,
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and `workers/__main__.py` now calls it.
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### 1.4 Infrastructure hidden from non-owners
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`app/interfaces/http/routers/sandbox.py`: every **mutating** route now requires the platform
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owner via a local `_require_platform_owner(context)` helper — create/destroy workspace,
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start/stop session, run command, read/write file, snapshot, preview URL, set limits. The
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**read-only status** routes (templates, effective limits, workspace list, command log) stay
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open to org members, because the project page shows them.
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`components/sandbox-panel.tsx` takes a `canManageInfra` prop (default `false`, so a call site
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that forgets it fails closed). A non-owner sees the limits card, the workspace list and a
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short note that infrastructure is managed by the platform owner; the create form, the session
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panel and the per-workspace action buttons are not rendered at all (not merely disabled).
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`(app)/projects/[id]/page.tsx` passes `canManageInfra={user?.is_platform_owner ?? false}`.
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## Files changed
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| File | Change |
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|---|---|
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| `app/infrastructure/adapters/process.py` | new — hardened host subprocess runner |
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| `app/infrastructure/adapters/docker_sandbox.py` | new — the docker/podman sandbox adapter |
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| `app/infrastructure/adapters/registry.py` | `SANDBOX_PROVIDER=docker` branch |
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| `app/infrastructure/repositories/sandbox.py` | `list_active_external_ids()` |
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| `app/workers/sandbox_gateway.py` | `reap_orphans()`, `run_pass()` |
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| `app/workers/__main__.py` | sandbox-gateway pass calls `run_pass()` |
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| `app/interfaces/http/routers/sandbox.py` | owner-only mutating routes |
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| `tests/test_docker_sandbox.py` | new — 37 tests |
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| `tests/test_workers.py` | 2 sandbox tests now use a platform-owner org |
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| `tests/test_e2e_smoke.py` | smoke path signs up as the platform owner |
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| `apps/web/src/components/sandbox-panel.tsx` | `canManageInfra` gating |
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| `apps/web/src/app/(app)/projects/[id]/page.tsx` | passes the owner flag |
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| `apps/web/src/test/delivery-sandbox-panel.test.tsx` | new — 3 tests |
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| `.gitignore` | `.pytest-tmp/` |
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## Test output
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```
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apps/api: 346 passed (was 309; +37)
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ruff check . -> All checks passed!
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mypy app -> Success: no issues found in 127 source files
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apps/web: 67 passed (was 64; +3)
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tsc --noEmit -> clean
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next lint -> No ESLint warnings or errors
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```
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## Deviations from the TODO
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1. **No worktrees.** The plan's environment (exFAT `/projects`, ext4 worktrees under
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`/home/mamad/work/`) describes a Linux box. This machine is macOS with the repo at
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`/Users/mamad/Projects/agy-bot/web`; all work is done on `dev` and committed per phase.
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2. **Owner-only rather than "admin+ with a setting".** The TODO offered both; owner-only is
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the stated preference and matches "users never touch infrastructure" (PLAN-v2 §1.9).
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3. **Test updates.** Making sandbox mutation owner-only breaks three existing tests that drove
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those routes as a plain manager. `test_e2e_smoke.py` and the two sandbox-gateway tests in
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`test_workers.py` now sign up as the platform owner. No assertion was weakened; only the
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actor's platform role changed.
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4. **`tmp_path` needs a writable `TMPDIR` on this machine.** The pre-existing
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`$TMPDIR/pytest-of-unknown` directory is rejected by the local sandbox broker, so pytest
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cannot create its base temp dir. Tests are run with `TMPDIR=<repo>/.pytest-tmp/tmproot`
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(now gitignored). This is an environment quirk, not a code change.
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## Open questions / CHANGE REQUESTS
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- **None.** `RepoWorkspacePort`, `DeliveryHooks` and `DeployTargetTester` are consumed exactly
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as frozen; the docker adapter adds methods rather than changing the port.
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## Known limitations
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- The workspace registry (external id → image) is process-local. A cold process rebuilds the
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host dir from the encoded external id but falls back to the default image; in practice
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`create_workspace` and `start_session` happen in the same request.
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- `snapshot` does not capture the work tree (bind mount). Documented in the docstring.
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- No `@pytest.mark.docker` integration test yet; the fake runner covers the argv contract,
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which is where the security properties live. A live round-trip is added in Phase 3, where
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the build/demo containers make it meaningful.
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