The user-visible payoff of the whole delivery workstream.
- (app)/app: four tabs — pipeline (runs + the eight steps + a live console),
releases (with demo rollback), production (target summary, confirmed deploy,
history), Git. The header answers "is it live": demo URL, live release,
health state.
- Live console: batches onto an animation frame, stops following the tail the
moment the user scrolls away from the bottom, strips ANSI colour codes and
carriage-return redraws. A console that yanks the view back is worse than none.
- Production panel: the target is shown as the operator recognises their server
plus has_secret/ثبت شده. No field anywhere could render a credential.
- contracts: the v2 delivery types and seven new WsEventType members.
- /admin/sandbox (owner): per-role container counts, running containers, per-org
limits, image mapping, stop with the id typed back (audited). A provider without
the capability reports an empty list rather than an error.
- /admin/domains (owner): every route with its owning app, attach/detach (host
typed back), idempotent re-sync.
- /projects removed entirely, with a permanent redirect to /app.
Tests: 502 API (+3), 78 web (+11); ruff, mypy, tsc and lint clean.
Report: docs/plan/reports/agent-3-phase-6.md
The one path that touches a customer's server, and the one the platform cannot
undo. It is human-triggered, confirmed and audited; there is deliberately no
code path from a pipeline run into it (D13).
- deploy_ssh.py: SshDeployer. Release lands in releases/<ts>-<sha7>/, the
post-deploy command runs with cwd there, and only then does `current` move —
atomically (relative symlink + mv -T). A failed hook or extraction never moves
it, so the previous release keeps serving. Host key is pinned on first success
(TOFU); a mismatch is a hard failure. Prunes to the newest five.
- deploy_ftp.py: FtpDeployer. FTP has no atomic switch and no rollback except a
backup, so a backup is mandatory: every file about to be overwritten is
archived under ARTIFACTS_ROOT before anything is uploaded. The artifact is
extracted, then the build dir (dist/build/public/out) is chosen — a static
deploy must not publish the repository. Archive members are sanitised: absolute
paths, `..` and escaping links are refused.
- deploy_target.py: the tester that dispatches on `kind`.
- deploy_service.py + production_deploys (migration a3b4c5d6e7f4) + 4 routes.
One deploy per project at a time; the org slug must be typed back; the target
summary reports has_secret, never the secret.
Tests: 499 API (+26) with fake SSH/FTP transports; ruff, mypy, alembic clean.
Report: docs/plan/reports/agent-3-phase-5.md
Domains are infrastructure, and in v2 infrastructure is the platform owner's
alone (D9). A tenant gets one automatic demo host and nothing else.
- admin_domains.py (owner-only): list every route with its owning app, attach an
extra host, detach with the host typed back as confirmation (audited), re-sync
the router from the database, and read the suggested MCP gateway route.
- domain/platform/rules.py: validate_extra_host. Two shapes only — a single
label under the managed root, or a full custom FQDN when ALLOW_CUSTOM_DOMAINS
is on. A wildcard is refused in both (it would match another tenant's
subdomain), and so are 30 protected platform labels (git, mcp, panel, api...).
Enforced in the router *and* again in the adapter.
- Both router adapters gained routes_fingerprint / list_all_routes /
sync_routes. Re-sync writes and reloads only when the rendered state differs:
a reload drops every in-flight connection on the host, including live demos.
Adapter-level extras, not additions to the frozen DomainRouterPort.
- The member-facing preview-domain routes are owner-only now. They are kept
because the demo host is still created through them at app-creation time.
Tests: 473 API (+58); ruff and mypy clean.
Report: docs/plan/reports/agent-3-phase-4.md
A push to `dev` now becomes a live demo, and a failed build never takes the
demo down.
- Four tables (pipeline_runs, pipeline_steps, releases, app_runtimes) and their
migration; alembic upgrade/downgrade/check all clean.
- DeliveryService implements DeliveryHooks: on_app_created provisions the demo
port + host + first build (idempotently); on_branch_pushed queues a run for
`dev` and supersedes older *queued* runs, leaving a running one alone.
- The 8-step pipeline. Blue/green is real: the replacement starts on a staging
port, is healthchecked, and only then does the route move — then the previous
container is stopped. A failure removes the replacement, releases its port and
leaves the old container serving.
- The demo port ledger is the DATABASE, not the router adapters' in-memory maps:
the API and the delivery worker are separate processes.
- Runs are claimed with a conditional UPDATE, so two workers never build the
same run.
- Live logs are batched (1 event / 500 ms, 200 lines) and redacted as a whole
tail — per-chunk redaction misses a secret split across pipe reads, and the
*stored* tail leaked until this was fixed.
- delivery worker: drain the queue, then poll remotes for pushes made outside
the engine.
- 7 routes; reads need membership, actions need projects.manage and are audited.
Tests: 415 API (+21, 1 docker-marked skipped); ruff, mypy, alembic check clean.
Report: docs/plan/reports/agent-3-phase-3.md
The platform's side of D6: git runs on the host, in a gitdir that is never
mounted into a container, so repository credentials never reach the model.
- adapters/git_workspace.py: LocalGitWorkspaceAdapter implementing
RepoWorkspacePort. Bare shared gitdir + a dev work tree mounted at
/workspace + one linked worktree per task under work/.worktrees/<id>
(excluded via the gitdir's info/exclude, not the project's .gitignore).
Explicit --git-dir/--work-tree, core.hooksPath=/dev/null, fsmonitor off,
quotePath off, GIT_CONFIG_NOSYSTEM, a private HOME per project, prompts off,
one asyncio.Lock per project. Token via GIT_ASKPASS reading a 0600 file; SSH
key as a 0600 temp file with a pinned known_hosts. Everything deleted in a
finally; only a *path* ever travels through the environment.
- The bug this phase existed to find: --git-dir=<shared> does not address a
linked worktree, so `git commit` in a task worktree committed straight to
`dev`. Operations now address <gitdir>/worktrees/<task_id> explicitly — and
never read the worktree's .git file, which a repository can rewrite.
- domain/platform/rules.py: is_blocked_address (pure) + assert_remote_host_allowed
(resolves, refuses if any address is loopback/private/link-local/metadata).
Shared by the git remote test and, later, every deploy target.
- ProjectExternalGit domain model + repository; container_delivery wires the
real adapter behind GIT_WORKSPACE=local with a resolver that joins the
project, its repo and its (decrypted) credentials.
Tests: 394 API (+48) against real git and a local bare repo; ruff and mypy clean.
Report: docs/plan/reports/agent-3-phase-2.md
The execution boundary for v2. Adds the local docker/podman sandbox adapter
and the hardened host subprocess runner every other delivery adapter will use.
- adapters/process.py: the one place the platform shells out. argv-only (no
shell), start_new_session + killpg on timeout, concurrent stdout/stderr
drains with a byte cap, explicit minimal env (never os.environ), and a
missing binary reported as spawn_failed rather than an exception.
- adapters/docker_sandbox.py: DockerSandboxAdapter over SandboxProviderPort.
--user 1000:1000, --cap-drop ALL, no-new-privileges, pids/cpu/memory limits,
--read-only with tmpfs scratch, one bind mount (the work tree, never the git
dir), labels, no published ports. Path-safe file access; secrets refused in
`docker exec -e`. Extras for later phases: start_demo_container (loopback
publish only), list_managed_containers, remove_container.
- registry: SANDBOX_PROVIDER=docker, cached singleton so the workspace registry
survives create_workspace -> start_session.
- sandbox_gateway worker: reap_orphans() removes labelled containers no live
session points at, audited as sandbox.reap; run_pass() does both passes.
- sandbox router: every mutating route now requires the platform owner
(PLAN-v2 §7.7); read-only status routes stay open to org members.
- sandbox-panel: canManageInfra prop (fails closed) hides the create form,
the session panel and the action buttons from non-owners.
Tests: 346 API (+37), 67 web (+3); ruff, mypy, tsc and lint clean.
Three existing tests now drive the sandbox as the platform owner, since that
is who may touch it.
Report: docs/plan/reports/agent-3-phase-1.md
mjalmoudy94